Recent Decisions by unknown
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 4 Article 9 
1966 
Recent Decisions 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Decisions, 18 S. C. L. Rev. 690 (1966). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST-Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Bill-In a market
characterized by a long and continuous trend toward fewer owner
competitors, a merger by which the two combined companies
would control seven and one-half per cent of the gross retail
grocery sales in the area was deemed illegal-United States v.
Von's Grocery Go. (Sup. Ct. 1966).
In 1960 Von's Grocery Company and Shopping Bag Food
Stores, both large competitors in the Los Angeles, California,
retail grocery market, planned to merge, with Von's taking over
Shopping Bag's capital stock and assets which included thirty-
six stores. On March 25, 1960, the government sought a tem-
porary injunction against the proposed merger. On March 28,
1960 the district court refused to grant the injunction, and the
two companies immediately merged. In 1964 the district court,
after hearing all the evidence, concluded as a matter of fact that
the merger did not violate section 7 of the Clayton Act as
amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Bill" and
entered judgment for the defendant company.2 The government
appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court as author-
ized by section 2 of the Expediting Act.3 The Supreme Court,
held, reversed. The merger was in fact illegal; therefore, the
district court was directed to order divestiture of the six year old
merger without delay. United States v. Vo?'s Grocery, 86 Sup.
Ct. 1478 (1966). (6-to-2).
The Court in this case had the same interest in mind as did
Congress when the Sherman Act4 was enacted in 1890. At that
time many persons feared that the nation's industries were being
concentrated into the hands of a few powerful companies. By
1914, however, it was obvious that the Sherman Act had failed
to achieve its purpose of protecting the small businessman.
1. Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending
38 Stat. 731 (1914). The relevant part of the act reads as follows, with material
added by the amendment in italics.
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and io corpora-
tion sitbject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
2. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 233 F. Supp. 976 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
3. 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1964).
4. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
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Companies were using mergers instead of the trust device to
achieve the same result. Congress responded to the new challenge
by enacting section 7 of the Clayton Act which prohibited cor-
porations, under most circumstances, from merging by purchas-
ing the stock of their competitors. Businessmen soon found a
loophole in the new measure. The law prohibited companies from
acquiring the stock of their competitors, however, it did not pro-
hibit the purchase of their assets. The Supreme Court, in the
1926 case of Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC,6 gave legal sanction to
the loophole. As a result of this ruling, companies continued to
escape liability until 1950 when Congress passed the Celler-
Kefauver Anti-Merger Bill.7 The effect of this amendment was
to plug the loophole in section 7 of the Clayton Act and at the
same time to broaden its scope to include even small mergers.
Congress sought to preserve competition among many small com-
panies by "arresting a trend toward concentration in its incip-
iency before that trend developed to the point that a market was
left in the grip of a few big companies."8
One of the first cases to reach the Supreme Court under the
new law was Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.9 In ruling against
the proposed merger, the Court used a highly analytical approach
to the case by studying both the economic effect on the companies
and on the total market involved. However, in the next major
case under section 7, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,10
the Court answered the question of whether or not a merger may
substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.
Such a prediction is sound only if it is based upon a firm
understanding of the structure of the relevant market; yet
the relevant economic data are both complex and elusive.
And unless businessmen can assess the legal consequences
of a merger with some confidence, sound business planning
is retarded....
The intense Congressional concern with the trend toward
concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with
elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or
probable anti-competitive effects.
5. Clayton Act § 7, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
6. 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
7. Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
8. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 346 (1962).
9. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
10. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
1966]
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And so in any case in which it is possible, without doing
violence to the Congressional objective in Section 7, to sim-
pZify the test of illegality, the Courts ought to do so in the
interest of sound and practical judieia administration.11
In Von8 Grocery the Court achieved its simplified test of ille-
gality. However, it appears that this test fails to meet one of its
objectives. Although the burden of judicial administration has
been greatly lightened, the interest of the businessman may have
been subverted as a consequence. As illustration, in the Phila-
deZplia Bank case, the result of the merger would place thirty
per cent of the area's banking business in the hands of the com-
bined banks. This thirty per cent figure is substantial enough
to give warning to the business planners that the government
would step in. On the other hand, the merger in the Von's Gro-
cery case would place only seven and one-half per cent of the
total retail gross sales under Von's control.12 Of the four authori-
ties relied on by the Court in the Philadephia Bank case, this
figure is substantially below those suggested by three of them
and in line with only one.' 3 The above is not meant to infer that
the court is using a percentage figure as a guideline in these
cases. On the contrary, it is meant to show that a percentage
figure is not a reliable determinant in viewing proposed mergers.
The question then becomes, what other guidelines may business-
men follow in regard to a proposed merger?
14
11. Id. at 362-63. (Emphasis added).
12. This 7.5% figure was still not the largest in the market. The leading
firm had 8% of the market and the top eight firms, including Von's and Shop-
ping Bag, had 40.9% with the top twelve having 48.8% of the market. From
this, it can be seen that the 7.5% control as a result of the merger would not
represent a monopolistic grip on the relevant market.
13. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 n. 38 (1963).
KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTrrRUST PoLicy, at 133 (1959), suggest 20% should be
the point of prima facie unlawfulness; Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Anti-
Trist Policy, 104 U. PA. L. Ray. 176, 182 (1955), suggests a figure of 20%
also; Marklan, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7; A Six Year Ap-
praisal, 43 VA. L. Rav. 489, 521-22 (1957), uses the figure of 25% as control-
ling; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Eco-
noinis, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 308-16 (1960), is closer to the Von's Grocery
case in suggesting a test of 7% or 8%.
14. This discussion omits detailed consideration of the "failing company" doc-
trine. A statement of this doctrine is found in International Shoe Co. v. FTC,
280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
A corporation with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilita-
tion so remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure
with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury to the communities
where its plants were operated we hold that the purchase of its capital
stock by a competitor (there being no other prospective purchaser), not
with a purpose to lessen competition, but to facilitate the accumulated
3
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The primary question with which the Court concerned itself
was whether the relevant market was characterized by a trend
toward fewer owner-competitors. The Court adopted the "count-
ing of heads"'5 technique castigated by Mr. Justice Stewart's
dissent, and found that in the eleven year period from 1950-1961,
the number of single store grocery firms in the area had de-
creased twenty-nine per cent, from 5,365 to 3,818.10 Despite the
district court's finding that competition was not adversely af-
fected by the merger, the Supreme Court, viewing the decrease,
struck down the merger.
The Court's new test poses a definite problem in many areas
which previously seemed beyond judicial concern. When a merg-
er is proposed now, two basic questions must be answered. The
first stands on firm ground; that being, what will be the resulting
market concentration in relation to the remainder of the firms
in the market? If this percentage is large, then the result of gov-
ernmental action can be predicted as in the Philadelphia Bank
case. However, if the percentage is small in contrast to the mar-
ket, it must be determined whether the market is characterized
by a trend toward concentration. The answer to the latter ques-
tion will not be readily ascertainable in most instances. After the
first merger in a market, when does the judicially suspect trend
develop? At this point, the parties are faced with the question,
will our merger be the one with which to end the trend?
The problem in the Von'8 Grocery case was complicated fur-
ther by the Court's order to dissolve the sim year old merger im-
mediately. This order points up two vital problems facing the
parties to a proposed merger. First, if the merging parties re-
ceive a favorable ruling in the district court, the question of
whether or not to merge remains practically important, because
where the companies go ahead with their plans, they may still
face a reversal as in the Von's Grocery case. Second, if they wait
for an extended period of time for final judgment to be ren-
dered, the possibility of two controlling changes occurs. The eco-
nomic feasibility of the merger may have diminished to a point
business of the purchaser and with the effect of mitigating seriously
injurious consequences otherwise probable, is not in contemplation of law
prejudicial to the public, and does not substantially lessen competition
or restrain commerce within the intent of the Clayton Act.
The 1950 amendment to § 7 of the Clayton Act did in no way restrict the
application of this doctrine. See 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWs 4299 (1950).
15. 86 Sup. Ct. 1478, 1488 (1966).
16. Id. at 1484 (concurring opinion).
19661
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where the advantages sought are lost; and further, if an unfavor-
able ruling is obtained and the company still wishes to expand,
the cost of building may have risen substantially. This latter
factor is compounded if the company is required to bear the cost
of divestiture as did Von's.
It should be noted that not all transactions which meet with
judicial disapproval are ordered to dissolve. This is true where
such a divesture is virtually impossible due to physical or eco-
nomic factors. The industry involved is to a certain extent con-
trolling here. This is one factor in favor of proceeding with the
merger if a favorable ruling is received in the district court. In
other words, an injunction not to do something is easier to effect
than to undo that which is already done. Such a move is not a
guarantee, however, as the TVon's Grocery case vividly illustrates.
In short, the businessman wishing to merge is faced with the
problem of determining if a trend toward fewer competitors has
developed in the relevant market. If the answer is yes, the court
may decide that the trend has developed far enough and rule
against the merger and leave the businessman with all of the
problems attendant upon a frustrated merger of business in-
terests.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissent-
ing opinion in the Von's Grocery case,' used the same detailed
economic analysis the Court employed in ruling against the merg-
er in the Brown Shoe Co. case. After making this analysis, Jus-
tice Stewart decided in favor of the Von-Shopping Bag merger.
This illustrates that the simpZe trend-test developed by the Court
is truly for judicial administration and not for the businessman
planning a merger.
C. TMOTHY SUL IVAN
17. Accord, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295,
348 (D. Mass. 1954), affd per cfuriam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ; United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945). In the United
Shoe case, the court said:
The Government's proposal that the Court dissolve United into three
separate manufacturing companies is unrealistic. United conducts all
machine manufacture at one plant in Beverly, with one set of jigs and
tools, one foundry, one laboratory for machine problems, one managerial
staff, and one labor force. It takes no Solomon to see that this organism
cannot be cut into three equal and viable parts.
In the Aluminum Co. case, the court stated:
Dissolution is not a penalty but a remedy; if the industry will not need
it for its protection, it will be a disservice to break up an aggregation
which for so long has demonstrated its efficiency.
18. 86 Sup. Ct. 1478, 1485 (1966).
[Vol. 18
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CIVIL RIGHTS-Owner of establishment selling food, fifty per
cent of which is carried off premises for consumption, may prop-
erly refuse service to persons solely because of their race-
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. (D.S.C. 1966).
The Negro plaintiffs were refused service at one of five drive-
in restaurants operated by the defendant, Piggie Park Enter-
prises. The fact that the defendant, at all establishments operated
by it, denies full and equal service to Negroes because of their
race was uncontested and completely established by the evidence.
Alleging that the defendant's refusal to serve them constituted
a violation of Title HI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 the plain-
tiffs filed suit for enforcement of rights under the act on behalf
of themselves and others similarly situated. Jurisdiction over
proceedings instituted pursant to this title is expressly conferred
upon the federal district courts.
2
The United States District Court for South Carolina, held,
that an establishment principally engaged in selling food, fifty
per cent of which is carried off the premises for consumption,
is exempt from the coverage of Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and that the owner of such an 'establishment is within
his rights in refusing to serve persons solely because of their race.
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprtses, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941
(D.S.C. 1966).
Immediately after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
litigation arose challenging the constitutionality of its several
sections. This issue was conclusively resolved in favor of Con-
gress.8 Subsequently, in a continued effort to avoid the imposi-
tions of the act, some cases have admitted its constitutionality,
but have denied that certain facilities were within the scope
of its authority.4 Essentially, for a business operation to be sub-
ject to the act, it must first be a public place described therein
and secondly it must affect interstate commerce. 5 Any business
that either "serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a sub-
stantial portion of the food which it serves . . .has moved in
1. 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
2. 78 Stat. 245, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(6) (1964).
3. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see also Willis v. Pickrick
Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396 (1964).
4. Cuevas v. Sdrales, 344 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Robertson v. John-
ston, 249 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La. 1966); Tyson v. Cazes, 238 F. Supp. 937
(E.D. La. 1965).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a (b)(2), (c) (1964).
1966]
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[interstate] commerce" ' is deemed by the act to affect interstate
commerce.
However, this requirement is a condition subsequent and does
not warrant consideration until the facility involved first quali-
fies as one of the places covered by the act. To determine this,
one must look to section 2000 a (b) (2) which embodies "any res-
taurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consump-
tion on the premises."7 Most of the cases which have maintained
that various operations were beyond the coverage of the act
referred to places engaged in the sale of beer or other alcoholic
beverages. Understandably disregarding its value as nutrition,
the courts have refused to equate beer with food and have ex-
empted these operations from the act.8
In the instant case, however, the court had to contend with a
more involved situation. Here, the corporate defendant sold food
but, through its general manager and principal stockholder, testi-
fied that fifty per cent of the business volume is carried off the
premises for consumption. The attorney for the plaintiff did not
challenge or rebut the testimony. 9 He might have been unable
to prove otherwise,10 or, more probably, wanted a determination
as to whether such a place would be excluded from the act.
Regardless of his intentions, the court was obliged to accept
the estimate as correct. The court then concluded that if fifty
per cent of defendant's sales are carried off the premises for
consumption, the defendant could not be considered as princi-
pally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises,
and consequently, was beyond the intended scope of the act.
In so doing, the court held the qualifying language "consumed
on the premises" to relate to every operation mentioned in section
2000 a (b) (2). On appeal it may be decided that this qualification
pertains only to the words "or other facility" and that every
other establishment (restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch
counter and soda fountain) is per se a place of public accommo-
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a (c) (1964).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a (b) (2) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
8. Cuevas v. Sdrales, 344 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1965); Robertson v. John-
ston, 249 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. La. 1966); Tyson v. Cazes, 238 F. Supp. 937
(E.D. La. 1965).
9. This fact was expressly noted in the decision.
10. Defendant sold all orders in paper containers and provided no eating
facilities. Additionally, it sold orders of barbecue, slav and hash in bulk by
the pound and quart.
[Vol. 18
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dation, if it affects interstate commerce. Even if the court should
so interpret the statute and further consider a drive-in as a res-
taurant, there is strong evidence that the court's definition of
restaurant is an establishment -where the food sold is to be con-
sumed on the premises." There is some authority suggesting
that this is not essential to the term restaurant; however, this is
a result of its application in an entirely different context. 1L2
A study of legislative hearings reveals that Congress did not
intend for the act to encompass every possible business activity
within the purview of its commerce power. Senator Humphrey
and Senator Kuchel, who sponsored the measure and marshalled
the forces for its passage, indicated very clearly that Congress
only intended to remove by law those areas of discrimination
that were the most flagrant and troublesome and meant to rely
on public effort and voluntary action to eliminate those less
bothersome areas.' 3 Since there is a minimum of social contact
at an operation of the kind involved here, it could be construed
to fall in the latter category.
The statutory language viewed in the light of its legislative
intent indicates that the court made the correct decision. How-
ever, no great impact on the restaurant industry is foreseen,
since exemptions are to be granted only in the uncommon case
of the retail food business discussed herein, which represents
but a small group. Furthermore, in future cases, the drive-in
restaurant owner no doubt will be called upon to present irre-
futable evidence that fifty per cent of the sales are carried off
the premises.
A.RTnuut GPXGoRY
11. E.g., Manesis v. Sulumar, 150 Ga. 315, 103 S.E. 459 (1920); State v.
Avent, 253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E2d 47 (1961); State v. Shoaf, 179 N.C. 744, 102
S.E. 705 (1920); Errington v. Birt (Eng), 105 LT NS 373; 28 C.J.S. Eating
house (1941).
12. E.g., Michigan Pacldng Co. v. Messaris, 257 Mich. 422, 241 N.W. 236
(1932) ; Richards v. Washington F & M Ins. Co., 60 Mich. 420, 27 N.W. 586
(1886); 43 C.J.S. Innkeepers § 1(b) (1945).
13. 110 Cong. Rec. 6533 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey) ; 110 Cong.
Rec. 6557 (1964) (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
1966]
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Habeas Corpus-Mental Incompe-
tence to Stand Trial-Unintentional suppression of evidence re-
garding defendant's mental incompetence by prosecutor and
intentional suppression by defendant's counsel of same evidence
held fundamentally unfair and violative of due process--Evans
v. Kropp (E.D. Mich. 1966).
The defendant's attempted suicide after his arrest on a charge
of first degree murder resulted in a psychiatric diagnosis which
disclosed his incompetence to stand trial and recommended a
sanity hearing. This recommendation was communicated to the
defendant's retained counsel, to a guard at the hospital, and was
entered into the defendant's hospital record.
An initial guilty plea by the defendant was refused because
of the possibility of a defense of self defense. A subsequent guilty
plea was accepted, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for
second degree murder. The court record was devoid of any ref-
erence to the defendant's mental incompetence.
In granting a writ of habeas corpus and ordering the release
of the defendant, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan, held, that the unintentional suppression
of evidence regarding the defendant's mental incompetence by
the prosecutor and the intentional suppression of the same evi-
dence by the defendant's counsel was fundamentally unfair and
violative of due process. Eva= v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.
Mich. 1966).
The court based its findings of failure of fundamental fairness
and due process upon two grounds:
1. The prosecutor was charged with knowledge of the diag-
nosis through his agent, the hospital guard, and nondis-
closure of this evidence was fundamentally unfair regardless
of the fact that it was not intentionally or willfully sup-
pressed;' and
2. Suppression from the court of such material evidence by
the defendant's retained counsel deprived the defendant of
effective assistance of counsel.2
Brady v. aryZand,3 the most recent United States Supreme
Court consideration of the prosecutor's duty of disclosure, held
that when a prosecutor intentionlly suppresses evidence favor-
1. Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
2. Id. at 222.
3. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
[Vol. 18
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able to an accused upon request, he violates due process where
such evidence is material to the guilt or punishment of the ac-
cused. No distinction was made between good faith or bad faith
in the prosecutor's suppression. The implications of this decision
have been considered, modified and extended in the circuits,4 but
have not been reconsidered by the Supreme Court since their
enunciation in Brady.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico found a violation of due
process when the prosecutor negligently misplaced evidence fav-
orable to the defendant.5 The Eighth Circuit concluded that
where a prosecutor and judge knew of the defendant's previous
adjudication of insanity and did not raise the issue, federal
habeas corpus became available to a state prisoner who claimed
incompetence at the time of state proceedings." Similarly, in the
Fifth Circuit, the failure of a prosecutor to inform the defense
counsel of a doctor's diagnosis favorable to the defendant was
determined to be of such fundamental unfairness as to be a denial
of due process.
7
Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitenti, 8 upon which the Evans
court principally relied, held in effect that intentioaZ suppres-
sion by a prosecutor is not essential to habeas corpus. Whether
withheld purposely or negligently, failure to disclose material
evidence is equally harmful to a defendant, for such a nondis-
closure might have substantially contributed to his conviction.
Barbee deemed the nondisclosure particularly prejudicial to the
defendant's rights where the undisclosed facts fall "beyond the
line of tolerable imperfection and into the field of fundamental
unfairness.""
If the defendant is not competent to assist in his own defense
or to understand the proceedings against him, his trial and con-
viction violate certain "immutable principles of justice which
inhere in the very idea of free government."' Where serious
doubt exists as to the defendant's sanity and an assigned counsel
fails to file a written plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity,"
which prevents the defendant from raising the insanity defense
4. E.g., Clark v. Beto, 359 F2d 554 (5th Cir. 1966); Schaber v. Maxwell,
348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
5. Trinble v. State, 75 N.M. 183, 402 P2d 162 (1965).
6. Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1965).
7. Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
8. 331 F2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
9. Id. at 846.
10. Clark v. Beto, 359 F2d 554, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1966).
19661
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at his trial, a violation of the right to effective assistance of
counsel has occurred.
11
In Evans, the retained counsel knew of the psychiatric recom-
mendation but did not assert it to the court. It was his contention
that the defendant would be better off going to prison for ten
years with an opportunity for parole than being committed to an
inadequate state hospital for the criminally insane. Relying on
the Barbee decision, the court suggested that the controlling
factor, in a situation where material evidence is in the possession
of the state and is not disclosed to the court, is not whether the
defense counsel knew or should have known about it, but rather
is whether the procedure as a whole comports with the require-
ments of due process.12 It concluded that no attorney has the
right to suppress such critical evidence on the basis of his per-
sonal judgment and appraisal of the benefits of such a course of
action to the defendant.
A guilty plea must be "made voluntarily with the understand-
ing of the nature of the charge"' 3 or the burden of proof of vol-
untariness shifts to the government in any post conviction
proceeding to vacate judgment or withdraw the guilty plea.
14
Under analysis, the most significant aspect of the Evans decision
is the extension of the rule of fundamental fairness to guilty
pleas. Previously it had been applied solely to convictions. In
achieving this extension of the rule, the decision has injected
into the roles of the prosecutor and retained counsel responsi-
bilities not previously demanded of them. The prosecution has
been charged with constructive notice of material evidence com-
municated to its agents, and where he is responsible for the sup-
pression of evidence material to his client's best interest, retained
counsel will be charged with ineffective assistance. The case
further substantiated that where material evidence is under con-
sideration, the intentiovaZ suppression principle enunciated in
Brady will not be the standard under which nondisclosures will
be scrutinized.
In view of the recent preponderance of Supreme Court de-
cisions establishing or defining individual rights, the Evans ex-
tension of nondisclosure to guilty pleas will undoubtedly be
approved and precedented on the theory of fundamental fairness.
JAN LYNN WARNR
11. Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
12. Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
13. FED. R. Ciam. P. 11.
14. Rimanich v. United States, 357 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 18
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EVIDENCE-Discovery-A court of equity has the inherent au-
thority in the promotion of justice and in the absence of a remedy
under the statute, to allow inspection of a chattel in the posses-
sion of an adverse party-Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
(S.C. 1966).
The plaintiffs brought an action for wrongful death and in-
juries against the estate of Gordon E. Long and others. The con-
troversy arose from a collision between two automobiles. The
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company was joined as a defendant
upon allegations that it negligently manufactured and sold a
defective tire with which the Long automobile was equipped,
and that the rupture of this tire was a contributing cause of the
fatal collision. The circuit court granted a petition by Goodyear
to inspect the allegedly defective tire in the possession of W. Ray
Long, executor. On appeal to the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina, held, affirmed. A court of equity has inherent authority in
the promotion of justice and in the absence of a remedy under
the statute to allow inspection of a chattel in the possession of
an adverse party. Em parte Goodyear Tire &f Rubber Co.,
S.C. -, 150 S.E.2d 525 (1966). (5 to 0).
The sole issue on appeal was whether the court had exceeded
its power by granting the inspection of the tire. At first review
this decision seems inconsistent with earlier precedents.
In Welsh v. Gibbons,1 the defendant was a bottler of Coca-
Cola, and the action was for damages allegedly sustained by
drinking from a bottle containing poisonous substances. The de-
fendant moved for leave to have a chemical analysis made of the
contents of the bottle, which was in the possession of the plain-
tiff's attorney. This motion was refused on the ground that the
court lacked the power to grant the relief sought, and the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina affirmed.
The Welsh decision was reaffirmed in Bailey V. Lyman Print-
ing & Finishing Co., 2 where the court held that the defendant's
motion for leave to take samples of paint from plaintiff's house,
allegedly damaged by defendant's wrongful act in polluting a
stream, was properly denied under the rule adopted in Welsh.
However, the court in Em parte Goodyear found a significant
distinction in the previous decisions under the Welsh rule and
the case at bar. In each of the earlier decisions, the issue arose
1. 211 S.C. 516, 46 S.E.2d 147 (1948).
2. 245 S.C. 13, 138 S.E2d 410 (1964).
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on a motion in an action at law, without a successful attempt to
invoke the equitable power of the court. The court observed in
Eo parte Goodyear that the petition was framed to invoke the
equity jurisdiction of the court, and recognized that although
discovery was not allowed in courts of law, it was an original,
inherent power of courts of equity.
Discovery was unknown to the early common law, and there
was no way by which an adverse party could be compelled to
produce documents or other articles in his possession for the use
of his opponent at the trial." The same rule was applied with
respect to chattels and premises in control of either party, with
courts of law declaring themselves without authority to permit
such relief. However, in chancery, bills of discovery were al-
lowed for the inspection of chattels and premises in the op-
ponent's possession or control wherever fairness seemed to
demand it.4
The common law rule was adopted by a majority of American
and English courts," and in the absence of a statute providing
otherwise is the present majority rule in the United States.6
South Carolina courts have held that there is no egaZ remedy
in the South Carolina Discovery Statutes7 which would authorize
the court to require a party in a pending case to produce and
permit his adversary to inspect an article or chattel in his pos-
session or under his control.8 Under South Carolina statutory
law, discovery is allowed with respect to books, papers and docu-
ments.9 Many states have passed legislation specifically giving
courts authority to grant full discovery to parties in civil
actions.10
Wigmore points out that even though common law courts
lacked power to order discovery, courts of chancery always had
3. Shlass Sheffield Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 167 Ala. 557, 52 So. 751
(1910).
4. 6 WiGIIoRE, EvDENCE § 1862 (3d ed. 1940).
5. E.g., Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W2d 389
(1950); O'Reilly v. Superior Court, 45 R.I. 491, 124 Atl. 1 (1924); Martin v.
lliott, 106 Mich. 130, 63 N.W. 998 (1895); Turquand v. Strand Union, 8
Dowl PC 201 (1840); Newham v. Taite, 6 Scott 575, 1 Arnold 244 (1838).
6. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 762 (1965).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 26-501 to -512 (1962).
8. Welsh v. Gibbons, 211 S.C. 516, 46 S.E2d 147 (1948).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-502 (1962).
10. Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 762 (1965). FD. R. Civ. P. 34, expressly provides
for production and inspection of "objects or tangible things" and for entry on
land for the purpose of "inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing
the property or any designated object or operation thereon."
[vol. 18
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this power whenever fairness seemed to demand it."' An exam-
ination of cases from common law jurisdictions supports this
position. 12 The South Carolina Supreme Court in Welsh recog-
nized this old proposition but concluded that statutes had pre-
empted early law on this point, and the statutes made no
provision for discovery of chattels.' 3 The court's conclusion,
therefore, was that courts lack inherent power to allow inspec-
tion of a chattel.14 Following Welsh, and until the decision in
Ex parte Goodyear, there was uncertainty surrounding those
types of discovery other than provided for by statute. With the
decision in Ex parte Goodyear, the court dispelled all doubt as
to its position on discovery in equity.
This new rule represents a much needed change in the field of
discovery in state courts. It will no doubt eliminate many injus-
tices; for now the two parties can come into court on equal terms
with respect to knowledge of the opposing parties' evidence.
However, this rule does not operate automatically. In order for
practicing attorneys in South Carolina to benefit from this new
rule, those seeking discovery with the right to inspect chattels
or premises must frame their petition to invoke the equity juris-
diction of the court.
Having now answered the question as to the discovery of a
chattel, the question arises as to how far the court will extend
this rule. South Carolina courts do not at present require a
plaintiff to submit to a physical examination at the request of
an adverse party.15 This position of the court was assailed as
unsound and contrary to reason less than a decade after its initial
enunciation,' 6 but nevertheless has survived through many deci-
sions even where conceded to be a potential breeding ground of
injustice. Where evidence is peculiarly within the control of one
11. 6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1862 (3d ed. 1940).
12. E.g., Union Oil Co. v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 4 Cal. 2d 541, 51 P2d 81
(1935); Williams v. Phiel, 66 Fla. 192, 62 So. 658 (1913); Smuggler-Union
Mim. Co. v. Kent, 47 Colo. 320, 112 Pac. 223 (1910); Bennett v. Griffiths, 3
El. & El. 467, 121 Eng. Rep. 517 (1861) ; Lewis v. Marsh, 8 Hare 97, 68 Eng.
Rep. 288 (1849); Walker v. Fletcher, 3 Bligh 172, 4 Eng. Rep. 568 (1804).
13. 211 S.C. 516, 519, 46 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1948).
14. Id. at 522, 46 S.E.2d at 150.
15. Dreery v. Jefferson Standard Ins. Co., 174 S.C. 63, 176 S.E. 876 (1934);
Brackett v. Southern Ry., 88 S.C. 447, 70 S.E. 1026 (1910) ; Best v. Colum-
bia Street Ry., Light & Power Co., 85 S.C. 422, 67 S.E. 1 (1909); Easier v.
Southern Ry., 60 S.C. 117, 38 S.E. 258 (1900). But see, Proctor v. Corley's
Garage, 246 S.C. 478, 144 S.E.2d 285 (1966).
16. Best v. Columbia Street Ry., Light & Power Co., 85 S.C. 422, 428, 67
S.E. 1, 3 (1909) (concurring and dissenting opinions).
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party to an action and he fails or refuses to produce it, his ad-
versary is entitled to raise an inference that the reason for such
nondisclosure is the unfavorable nature of the evidence.17 The
United States Supreme Court indicated approval of such a find-
ing in Union Pao. R.R. 'v. Botsford' by determining that a
plaintiff's refusal to submit to examination of his person should
be considered by the jury as bearing upon his good faith. Wig-
more concluded that "the party's refusal to submit to a physical
examination should . . . be open to inference, for he is virtually
withholding evidence; and this is generally conceded."19
The Welsh court recognized these positions regarding physical
examinations and allowable inferences to be drawn from a failure
or refusal to submit to them. If Evo parte Goodyear foments a
general liberalization in South Carolina discovery law, the next
logical step might well be to provide for the physical examina-
tion of an adverse party.
E parte Goodyear made no attempt at resolving the important
question of extent of control which may be exercised over the
plaintiff's evidence by his adversary's attorney. This question
will undoubtedly give rise to much future litigation.
Mums LOADHoLT
17. Wingate v. Postal Tele. & Cable Co., 204 S.C. 520, 30 S.E.2d 307 (1944).
18, 141 U.S. 250, 255 (1891).
19. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 289 (3d ed. 1940).
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PROBATION-Probationer's Right to Counsel at Revocation
Hearing-In order that the proceeding be constitutionally accept-
able, the probationer must be advised of his right to counsel-
People v. Hamilton (N.Y. 1966).
The petitioner entered a guilty plea to a charge of robbery in
the second degree in 1955 and was sentenced to a reformatory
until discharged by law, a period not to exceed five years. The
sentence was suspended, and the petitioner was placed on proba-
tion. On February 11, 1959, he was found guilty of the violation
of his probation and was sentenced to a term of from seven to
fifteen years. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Erie County, the
petitioner alleged that upon the violation hearing he was neither
represented nor advised of his right to be represented by counsel.
In denying relief the supreme court ruled that the petition did
not state facts sufficient to entitle him to a hearing for the reason
that there was no requirement that a person charged with viola-
tion of probation be advised of his right to counsel. On appeal
to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held, reversed. Be-
cause of the importance of the proceeding and the necessity of
giving the defendant advice which would enable him to under-
stand his rights and to protect himself by availing himself of
those rights, the accused was entitled to counsel and should have
been so advised. People v. Hamilton, 271 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N. Y.
1966). (5-to-O).
Even though probation revocation proceedings are frequently
challenged for want of notice and hearing, there are very few
instances in which the courts have elected to declare expressly
whether even a right to notice and hearing before revocation has
a constitutional basis.' There are a number of decisions in which
the courts have ruled that the probationer has been granted only
conditional liberty, and should he deviate from certain standards
of good behavior, his probation is subject to revocation without
any constitutional considerations as to whether or not he should
first be granted a hearing or given notice.
2
In 1935 the United States Supreme Court rejected the claim
that a hearing before revocation of probation was a constitutional
right, reasoning that probation or suspension of a sentence comes
as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime and can be condi-
1. 29 A.L.R.2d 1079 (1951).
2. E.g., Pagano v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798 (1930); People v.
Dudly, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912) ; cf. Couture v. Brown, 82 N.H.
459, 135 AUt. 530 (1926).
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tioned without constitutional violation. 3 It appears, therefore,
that although no specific mention was made of counsel, there is
no constitutional mandate requiring that an indigent probationer
be provided counsel at a revocation hearing.
Congress has subsequently decreed that the federal probationer
who is arrested on a charge of violation of probation "shall be
taken before the court having jurisdiction over him as speedily
as possible," 4 but there is still no statutory provision that counsel
be provided probationer at a revocation hearing.5 Neither has
there been any judicial modification of the standards as orig-
inally enunciated in Escoe v. Zerb8t.6
The rule generally adhered to in the federal jurisdiction is
that the probationer accused of violation of the terms of his pro-
bation is not entitled to a jury tria7 but only to a fair and im-
partial determination s as to whether he has conducted himself
in accordance with his duty.9 The court in Benmnett v. United
State8" seems to suggest, however, that there may be circum-
stances in which the denial of a probationer's request for ap-
pointed counsel would "constitute an abuse of judicial discre-
tion."" In the absence of any evidence pointing to abuse of dis-
cretion in not appointing counsel at the hearing, there is no justi-
fication for vacating the decision of a district court.' 2
A recent survey indicates that a total of eleven states either
expressly authorize revocation of probation without a hearing
or their statutes do not indicate whether a hearing is required.
Eleven others merely imply that a hearing is to be held in such
broad terms as directing that the probationer be "brought before.
the court," and nine states expressly provide that the hearing
need only be summary or informal.'3
3. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
4. 18d U.S.C.A. § 3653 (paragraph 31) (1951).
5. Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F.2d 410 (C.C.A. Kan. 1947).
6. Byerly, Looking At The Law, 30 Fed. Prob. 64 (1966).
7. Strickland v. United States, 114 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1940).
8. United States v. Moore, 101 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1939).
9. Dillingham v. United States, 76 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1935).
10. 158 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1946) (dictum).
11. Id. at 415.
12. Kelly v. United States, 235 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1956).
13. Sklar, Law and Practice it Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings,
J. Cau. L., C. & P.S. 175, 176-82 (1964).
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Although several states have provided by statute that the pro-
bationer be appointed counsel at a revocation hearing,14 the pre-
ponderance of the cases reported in this area seem to indicate that
a majority of the states do not recognize appointed counsel as
either a statutory or a constitutional right.15 Of these, some have
adopted the position that the right to a hearing includes the
"right to be heard by counsel employed by the alleged violator,
but should not be construed as requiring the appointment of
counsel."'
6
On the other hand, some jurisdictions have adopted the posi-
tion that the right to a hearing before revocation of probation
is a fundamental requirement of due process' 7 necessitating the
probationer's representation by counsel in order to be constitu-
tionally acceptable.' 8 This seems to be the enlightened contem-
porary view in this area which some authorities anticipate being
adopted by the courts "unless the statutes are amended to clearly
state that there is no necessity for this."'19 It seems inevitable, in
view of recent Supreme Court decisions stressing individual
rights and liberties,20 that the Court will accept this doctrine as
law. If indeed the revocation hearing is truly a critical stage in
the proceedings through which the probationer attempts to retain
his freedom, it seems only logical, in light of the decisions ren-
dered in White v. Maryland2 l and Hamilton v. AZabama, 2 2 that
the Court would acknowledge the right to appoint counsel at this
stage. Having aligned herself with the proposition that due proc-
ess requires the indigent probationer be appointed counsel, it
seems a natural extension thereof that New York adopt as well
the federal standard providing that one who is entitled to coun-
sel has a right to be advised to that effect.
23
14. ALAsrA Comp. LAws ANN. § 66-16-32 (1949) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2713
(Supp. 1957) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.06 (1944) ; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
2907 (1955).
15. See, e.g., Ex parte Levi, 59 Cal. App. 2d 41, 244 P2d 403 (1952) ; EX
parte Dearo, 96 Cal. App. 2d 141, 214 P2d 585 (1950); Ex parte Anderson,
191 Ore. 409, 229 P2d 633 (1951).
16. Edwardsen v. Maryland, 220 Md. 82, 151 A2d 132, 136 (1958).
17. Hite v. Maryland, 198 Md. 602, 84 A2d 899 (1951); Commonwealth
ex rel. Remeriez v. Maroney, 415 Pa. 534, 204 A.2d 450 (1964).
18. Ibid.
19. Chappell, Due Process of Law As It Relates to Corrections, 29 Fed.
Prob. 5-6 (1965).
20. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
21. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
22. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
23. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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Though, as heretofore indicated, New York is in a definite
minority in so far as she recognizes the right to counsel as a due
process requirement, her position is avidly supported by recog-
nized authorities in this area.24 Some of these authorities feel
that the due process standards as applied in Escoe v. Zerbst25 are
procedural and that substantive standards if applied would ex-
tend the constitutional provisions applicable to the defendant at
trial to the probationer at a revocation hearing.26 In support of
this contention they refer to the fact that the increased use of
probation as a modern substitute for the traditional forms of
legal penalty requires an extension of the constitutional stand-
ards to some aspects of the probation procedure. 27 The Model
Penal Code gives support to the decision in the Hamilton case in
so far as it recommends that at revocation hearings the defendant
"shall have the right to hear and controvert the evidence against
him, to offer evidence in his defense, and to be represented by
cUnsel.' 28 Consequently, it is obvious that the court decided in
accordance with present day concepts regarding the protection of
individual rights and liberties at whatever stage the accused's
freedom might be placed in jeopardy.
Lnwoov S. EvAws
24. RUIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL ComREcTION 207 (1963).
25. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
26. Kean, Due Process Applied to Hearings for the Revocation of Juvenile
Probation, 16 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 178, 179-180 (1960).
27. Ibid.
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